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THE RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS PROBLEM: SMEARING
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Abstract. Certain attacks on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) based protocols
rely on reduction to the Polynomial Learning with Errors (PLWE) problem. In this work,
we answer questions posed recently by Y. Elias and others [14] regarding the smearing
condition that is used as a condition for a successful attack on the RLWE problem. The
map piα : Pq → Fq, g(x) 7→ g(α) smears if pi(S) = Fq, where Pq = Fq[x]/(f(x)), f(x) is a
monic irreducible polynomial over Z that splits completely over Fq, f(α) = 0, and S ⊂ Pq.
When piα does not smear, a PLWE problem instance is susceptible to attacks. We provide
estimation on the probability of smearing as a function of |S| and the distribution from
which elements of Pq are sampled.
1. Introduction
Quantum computing promises to be a game-changing technology, as many problems that are
considered intractable for conventional computers could be solved efficiently by harnessing
properties of quantum physics to represent information. While quantum computing creates
new methods to approach complex computing problems, unfortunately it is also a power-
ful tool for breaking existing cryptographic security. To address this, in 2016 the National
Institute of Standard and Technology [?] announced the need for new standards to replace
cryptosystems based on vulnerable problems with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) alter-
natives.
In quantum algorithmic development, there are currently two groundbreaking algorithms
which are foundational for breaking today’s public key cryptosystems. In 1994, Shor [25]
proposed an efficient polynomial-time algorithm for solving integer factorization and discrete
logarithm problems. In 1996, Grover [18] proposed a quantum algorithm that can be used
for breaking symmetric key cryptosystems.
Cryptography based on hard problems on lattices is conjectured to be secure against quan-
tum attacks. A large fraction of lattice-based cryptographic constructions are built upon
the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem or its variants. The Learning With Errors (LWE)
problem, introduced by O. Regev [24], relates to solving a “noisy” linear system modulo a
known integer. The “algebraically structured” variants, called Ring LWE (RLWE) [22], Poly-
nomial LWE [24], Module LWE [2]. As other cryptographic problems, LWE is an average-case
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problem which means the input instances are chosen at random from a prescribed probability
distribution.
Since its introduction, the LWE problem [24] has already been used as a building block
for many cryptographic applications. It has been used as a hardness assumption in the
constructions of efficient signature schemes [26], fully-homomorphic encryption schemes [5],
pseudo-random functions [3], protocols for secure multi-party computation [10], and also
gives an explanation for the hardness of the NTRU cryptosystem [19].
The RLWE and PLWE problems are formulated as either “search” or “decision” problems.
Let f(x) ∈ Z[x] to be monic and irreducible of degree n, P = Z[x]/f(x), and Pq = P/qP ∼=
Fq[x]/f(x) where q is a prime.
Search PLWE Problem. Let s(x) ∈ Pq be a secret. The search PLWE problem, is to
discover s(x) given access to arbitrarily many independent samples of the form (ai(x), bi(x) =
ai(x)s(x) + ei(x)) ∈ Pq × Pq, where for each i, ei(x) is chosen from a discretized Gaussian
of parameter σ, and ai(x) is uniformly random. The polynomial s(x) is the secret and the
polynomials ei(x) are the errors.
Decision PLWE Problem. Let s(x) ∈ Pq be a secret. The decision PLWE problem is to
distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the same number of independent samples
in two distributions on Pq × Pq. The first consists of samples of the form (a(x), b(x) =
a(x)s(x) + e(x)) where e(x) is chosen from a discretized Gaussian distribution of parameter
σ, and a(x) is uniformly random. The second consists of uniformly random and independent
samples from Pq × Pq.
In [7], an attack on PLWE was presented in rings Pq = Fq[x]/(f(x)), where f(1) ≡ 0 mod q.
There are also two standard PLWE problems, quoted here from [14]. Let K be number field
of degree n with ring of integers R. Let Rv denote the dual of R, Rv = {α ∈ K : Tr(αx) ∈
Z for all x ∈ R}. The standard RLWE problems [21] for a canonical discretized Gaussian
are defined as follows.
Search RLWE Problem. Let s ∈ Rvq be a secret. The search RLWE problem is to discover
s given access to arbitrarily many independent samples of the form (a, b = as + e) where e
is chosen from the canonical discretized Gaussian and a is uniformly random.
Decision RLWE Problem. Let s ∈ Rq be a secret. The decision RLWE problem is to
distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the same number of independent samples
in two distributions on Rq × Rvq . The first consists of samples of the form (a, b = as + e)
where e is chosen from the canonical discretized Gaussian and a is uniformly random, and
the second consists of uniformly random and independent samples from Rq ×Rvq .
The first attack on PLWE was developed by Eisentra¨ger et al. [15] by considering polynomial
rings of the form Zp[x]/f(x), where p is prime and f(x) is irreducible over Q, but it has a
low-order root α modulo p. Their attack exploits a ring homomorphism induced by α into
the finite field Fp. When p is small enough, it becomes feasible to search for the image of
secret s in Fp.
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Similar attacks were developed for more general RLWE cases ([6], [13]). The conditions for
a possible attack are similar, but the attacker is faced with bigger distortions introduced by
the conversion from RLWE instances to PLWE ones in order for the attack to work.
The attacks in [13], [15] and [6] can be described in terms of the ring homomorphisms from
Pq to smaller rings. As Pq ' Fnq , the only candidates are the projections to each factor:
piα : Pq → Fq, g(x) 7→ g(α)
for each root α of f(x). The vectors in Pq sampled by the Gaussian are easy to find since they
have small coefficients. However, it is hard to find them from b(x) = a(x)s(x)+e(x) without
knowledge of s(x) and there are too many possibilities s(x) to find them exhaustively.
In a small ring Fq, it is easy to go through all the possibilities for s(α) exhaustively and since
the ring homomorphism preserves the relationship b(α) = a(α)s(α) + e(α) one can obtain
e(α) = b(α) − a(α)s(α). In this case the Decision Problem for PLWE is solved as soon as
the set of e(α) that arises from the Gaussian is recognized.
This is possible when the image of the set of polynomials in Pq that are produced by the
Gaussian remain confined to a small subset of Fq (i.e. does not “smear” across all of Fq).
In this paper we are concern with the mapping piα : Pq → Fq, g(x) 7→ g(α) and the question
posed in [14] regarding subsets S ⊆ Pq with the property pi(S) = Fq (subsets S ⊆ Pq that
smear under pi). We provide estimation on the probability of smearing as a function of |S|
and the distribution from which elements of Pq are sampled.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes relevant background related to
the RLWE problems, Section 3 focuses on the smearing condition and gives an overview
of related work, Section 4 provides methods of calculating smearing probabilities for both,
uniform and non-uniform distributions, and in Section 5 we provide a smearing-based attack
on the PLWE problem.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Lattices and Gaussians. A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of a vector space V.
If V has dimension n a lattice L can be viewed as the set of all integer linear combinations of
a set of linearly independent vectors B = {b1, · · · , bk} for some k ≤ n, written L = L(B) =∑k
i=1 : zibi, zi ∈ Z}. If k = n we call the lattice full-rank, and we will only consider lattices
of full-rank. We can extend this notion of lattices to matrix spaces by stacking the columns
of a matrix. We recall two standard lattice definitions.
Definition 2.1. Given a lattice L in a space V endowed with a metric ‖, ‖, the minimum
distance of L is defined as λ1(Λ) = min06=v∈L‖v‖. Similarly, λn is the minimum length of
a set of n linearly independent vectors, where the length of a set of vectors {x1, · · · ,xk} is
defined as maxi‖xi‖.
Definition 2.2. Given a lattice L ⊆ V, where V is endowed with an inner product 〈·, ·〉,
the dual lattice L∗ is defined L∗ = {v ∈ V : 〈Λ,v〉 ⊂ Z}.
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For a vector space V with norm ‖, ‖ and σ > 0, we define the Gaussian function ρσ : Rn →
(0, 1] by
ρσ(x) = e
−−pi‖x‖2
2σ2 .
When sampling a Gaussian over a lattice L we will use the discrete form of the Gaussian
distribution.
The Gaussian distribution (normal distribution) with parameter σ > 0 has a continuous
probability density function
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
−pi‖x‖2
2σ2 .
Definition 2.3. A discrete Gaussian distribution Dσ with parameter σ > 0 over a lattice
L ⊂ Rn is a distribution in which each lattice point λ is sampled with probability Pλ
proportional to ρσ(λ).
Pλ :=
ρσ(λ)
ρσ(L) , ρσ(L) =
∑
λ∈L
ρr(λ)
2.2. Learning with Errors Distributions. Let f(x) be a monic irreducible polynomial
in Z[x] of degree n. We use the notation Rq to denote the the polynomial ring Zq[x]/〈f(x)〉.
An instance of the RLWE distribution is given by a choice of number field K, secret s, prime
q, and parameter σ (for the error distribution).
Definition 2.4 (RLWE Distribution, [14]). Let R = OK be the ring of integers for number
field K. Define
Rq = R/qR.
Let URq be the uniform distribution over Rq. Let the error distribution be Gσ,Rq , a discrete
Gaussian distribution over Rq. For some s ∈ Rq, a ← UPq , e ← Gσ,Rq , pairs of the form
(a, c = a · s+ e) compose the RLWE distribution Ls,Gσ over Rq ×Rq.
The PLWE distribution is defined similarly; rather than the ring of integers of a number field,
the distribution is defined over a polynomial ring. An instance of the PLWE distribution is
now given by a choice of monic, irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x], secret s, prime q, and
parameter σ (for the error distribution).
Definition 2.5 (PLWE Distribution, [14]). Let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be monic, irreducible of degree
n. Assume that f(x) splits over Zq := Z/qZ. Define
P := Z[x]/(f(x)), Pq := P/qP.
Let Gσ,P be a discrete Gaussian distribution over P spherical in the power basis of P
(1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1). Let UPq be the uniform distribution over Pq. Let the error distribu-
tion be Gσ,Pq a discrete Gaussian distribution over Pq.
For some s ∈ Pq, a← UPq , e← Gσ,Pq , pairs of the form
(a, c = a · s+ e)
compose the PLWE distribution Ls,Gσ over Pq × Pq.
Note 2.6. Note that Pq = Fq/f(x) ∼= Fq[β] for some transcendental β.
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3. Smearing Condition
3.1. Motivation and Related Work. A common technique for breaking cryptographic
schemes is to transfer the problem onto a smaller space, where looking for the secret key
by brute force is feasible. In finding the secret s ∈ Pq in a PLWE problem by brute force,
the attacker would have to go through qn different possibilities, which is infeasible due to
the sizes of q and n. However, if the attacker can somehow transfer the PLWE problem
onto a smaller field, like Zq, then brute force suddenly becomes feasible, and, if not much
information is lost in this transformation, then a brute search on Zq would help solve the
original problem on Pq.
An example of this approach is the “γ = 1 attack” on Decision-PLWE, as presented in [14].
Suppose that f has a root at γ = 1, i.e. f(1) ≡ 0 mod q. Expressing e in the power basis,
e(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 ejx
j, where ej ∼ G√nσ. Then, e(1) =
∑n−1
j=0 ej ← G√nσ. So, if samples follow
the PLWE distribution, e(1) can only take on a small range of values.
There are q possibilities for the value of s(1), so loop over all of them:
(1) Let g ∈ Fq be a guess for s(1)
(2) For each sample (ai, ci), compute ci(1)− g · ai(1)
• If guess for s(1) is correct, this will equal ei(1)
• If guess for s(1) is incorrect, or if (ai, ci) are uniform to begin with, this will be
uniform over Fq
(3) Check if ci(1)− g · ai(1) is within G√nσ
If there is one g for which all the ci(1)−g ·ai(1)’s are within G√nσ, the (ai, ci) are taken from
the PLWE distribution with g = s(1). If all possible g values give uniform distributions of
ci(1) − g · ai(1), the (ai, ci) are taken from the uniform distribution. If several g appear to
work, repeat the algorithm with more samples.
This attack works with probability > 1
2
. Similar attacks exist for γ of small order, where
γr ≡ 1 for some small r ∈ Z+.
Other attacks include exploitation of the size of the error values. However, the probability
of success for this particular attack decays (except for in a special case) and is unlikely to
be implemented [13].
Definition 3.1 ([14]). Let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be a monic, irreducible polynomial of degree n and
let γ be a root of f(x). Then a smearing map piγ is defined as
piγ : Fnq ∼= Pq → Fq
g(x) 7→ g(γ)
Definition 3.2 ([14]). Given a smearing map piγ and a subset S ⊂ Pq, we say that S smears
under piγ if piγ(S) = Fq.
Note that for a smearing map piγ we have ker piγ = (x−γ). Also, note that Pq(x−γ) ∼= Fq where
Pq is a polynomial ring and γ is one of its roots. This implies that (x − γ) has q cosets in
Pq, which are, consequently, {i+ (x− γ)}q−1i=0 .
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Lemma 3.3. Let piγ be a smearing map. Then the following holds
(1) piγ(j + (x− γ)) = j ∈ Fq.
(2) piγ(f) = piγ(g) if and only if f and g are in the same coset of (x− γ).
Proof. Claim (1) follows from Lemma ??. Claim (2) follows directly from the fact that
f(γ) = g(γ) if and only if f and g are in the same coset of (x− γ). 
This lemma implies that the set S smears, if S contains an element in each of the q cosets
of (x − γ) in Pq. In the next two sections we investigate the size of a subset sampled from
a uniform distribution and investigate the properties of a subset sampled from a Gaussian
distribution as in the PLWE problem.
3.2. Smearing: The Uniform Distribution Case. We investigate the size of a subset
sampled from a uniform distribution i.e the polynomials in S are chosen uniformly random
over Pq. As we will see, the assumption of uniformity eliminates much of the algebraic
aspects of the smearing problem as related to PLWE and reduces the problem to a classic
problem in probability theory, the Coupon Collector’s Problem.
The classical version of the Coupon Collector’s Problem is as follows: Suppose a company
places one of q distinct types of coupons, c1, . . . , cp, into each of its product objects with
equal probability 1
q
. Let X be a random variable indicating the number of objects one has
to buy before collecting all of the coupons. The question then is:
How many objects should one expect to buy before collecting at least one of each type of
coupon? Equivalently, what is E[X]?
The following is a well-known lemma which computes E[X] with a geometric distribution
approach.
Lemma 3.4 ([17]). Let X be the number of coupons needed to be purchased to collect all q
coupons. Then,
E[X] = qHq = q log q + γq +
1
2
+O(1/q)
where Hq is the q-th harmonic number and γ ≈ 0.57722 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
Furthermore,
Var(X) <
pi2
6
q2.
We can reduce the problem of uniform smearing to the Coupon Collector’s Problem.
Lemma 3.5. A uniform distribution over Pq maps under piγ to a uniform distribution over
Fq.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, and the fact that all cosets of (x−γ) are of the same size, a polynomial
chosen uniformly at random in Pq will have probability 1/q of being in any given coset of
(x− γ) and hence there is a 1/q probability that piγ produces any given element in Fq.

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So, instead of selecting polynomials in Pq we can choose elements of Fq uniformly. In this
context, the smearing problem is identical to the Coupon Collector’s Problem. Each poly-
nomial has an image uniformly chosen between 1 and q, and we want to “collect all the
coupons,” i.e. for each element j ∈ Fq, collect at least one polynomial having j = piα as its
image under the smearing map.
Let m = |S| and Fq be given. Assume that the elements of S are chosen uniformly at random
(s ∈ S, s← UPq). The question is to determine the probability that S ⊂ Pq will smear.
Remark 3.6. Note that, although in the smearing problem q must be prime, in the broader
context of the coupon collector’s problem q can be any positive integer; we will not demand
such a restriction within our probabilistic calculations.
Fix a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] and thus fix some root α ∈ Fq and the smearing map piα.
Denote with P (m, q) the probability that a subset S ⊂ Pq of size m smears.
Remark 3.7. Given a probability distribution on X (the random variable from the coupon
collector’s problem representing the number of cereal boxes one must purchase before col-
lecting all q coupons), P (m, q) is simply the cumulative distribution function of X, since
P (S smears) = P (X ≤ |S| = m).
3.3. Smearing: The Non-Uniform Case. In this section, we investigate the smearing
condition when the error distribution over Pq is not uniform. Note first that we can view
drawing from Ls,σ
(a, a · s+ e), a← UPq , s ∈ Pq, e← Gσ,Pq
as simply drawing
(a, e), a← UPq , e← Gσ,Pq
since multiplying an element a selected uniformly at random by a fixed secret s is the same
as selecting a ·s uniformly at random, which, when the Gaussian distribution is added, yields
the same Gaussian distribution for e. When we discuss the mapped error distribution, we
consider selecting e← Gσ,Pq and its mapping piα(e).
3.3.1. The Distribution of e(α). An explicit method of calculating the probability distribu-
tion of e(α) given the distribution of the polynomial coefficients of e is presented in [8].
Theorem 3.8. [8] Suppose e0, e1, ..., en−1 are independent random variables in Zq with
the same probability distribution (c0, c1, ..., cq−1). Let c(x) =
∑
i∈Zq cix
i. Then, for any
a1, ..., an−1 ∈ Zq, the probability distribution of e0 + e1a1 + · · · + en−1an−1 mod q can be
computed as the coefficients of the polynomial
c(x)c(xa1) · · · c(xan−1) mod xq − 1.
Since e(α) = e0 + e1α + e2α
2 + · · ·+ en−1αn−1,
by setting ai = α
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 and using the theorem above we can compute the probability
distribution of e(α) over Zq. In general, we refer to that distribution as χ, the “mapped error
distribution”.
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Figure 1. Initial Gaussian Distribution over Z607 with β = .01
Figure 2. Mapped Error Distribution given Figure 1 over Z607 with α = 396,
α3 ≡ 1 mod 607
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We can compute the discrete Gaussian distribution over Zq = Z/qZ as in [8]. The parameter
used is σ = β√
2pi
∗ q. Note that the low multiplicative order of α = 396 over Z607 gives the
mapped error distribution structure; this illustrates the setting for the α of low order attack,
as the mapped error distribution is certainly not uniform.
4. Computing Smearing Probabilities
Let χ be a discrete probability distribution on [q], and let Pχ(m, q) denote the probability
that, when m samples are independently drawn from χ, they will “smear,” i.e. each element
in [q] will be chosen at least once. When χ is the uniform distribution, we denote this
probability as PU(m, q), or simply as P (m, q). In this section, we provide practical ways of
calculating these probabilities.
4.1. An Approximation of Uniform Smearing Probabilities. A result by Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi [16] gives a way to approximate P (m, q) for large values of q.
Theorem 4.1 (Erdo˝s, Re´nyi [16]). Let U be the uniform distribution over [q], and let X
be the random variable denoting the number of independent samples one must take from U
until picking each of [q] at least once. Then,
lim
q→∞
Pr(X < q log q + cq) = exp(− exp(−c)).
In our case, P (m, q) = Pr(X ≤ m), so making the substitution m = q log q + cq gives the
formula
P (m, q) ≈ exp
(
−q exp
(
−m
q
))
.
Although this is a powerful approximation, for some applications it might be preferable to
calculate this probability exactly for concrete values of m and q. The following sections
contribute towards this goal, as well as give formulas for the case when χ is not uniform.
4.2. A Recursive Formula in m.
Proposition 4.2. Let χ be a discrete probability distribution on [q], with pk being the proba-
bility of picking the kth element. Let χ/k denote the probability distribution on q−1 elements
after the kth element has been removed from χ, and the remaining probabilities have been
normalized. Then,
Pχ(m, q) = Pχ(m− 1, q) +
q∑
k=1
pk(1− pk)m−1 · Pχ/k(m− 1, q − 1).
Proof. Assume that we choose m independent samples one-by-one from the distribution χ.
Let S be the event that the samples smear. Let A be the event that the mth sample achieves
smearing (i.e. the previous m− 1 samples cover q− 1 distinct elements, and the mth sample
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happens to cover the remaining qth element). Also, let B be the event that smearing happens
within the first m−1 samples (i.e. by the time m−1 samples have been taken, they already
take on q distinct values). Notice that S = A unionsqB. Therefore,
Pχ(m, q) = Pr(S) = Pr(A) + Pr(B).
To calculate P (A), we use the Law of Total Probability to condition on the outcome of the
mth sample, which we denote by K ∈ [q]:
Pr(A) =
q∑
k=1
Pr(A|K = k) · Pr(K = k)
=
q∑
k=1
Pr(A|K = k) · pk.
To calculate the value of Pr(A|K = k), we notice that the only way that smearing is achieved
by the mth sample being equal to k is if, first, the previous m− 1 samples all fall into [q]/k,
and, second, if the previous m− 1 samples smear on [q]/k. Therefore,
Pr(A|K = k) = (1− pk)m−1 · Pχ/k(m− 1, q − 1),
where (1− pk)m−1 is the probability that the first m− 1 samples are contained in [q]/k, and
Pχ/k(m − 1, q − 1) is the probability that, conditioned on this, these m − 1 samples smear
on [q]/k. Hence,
Pr(A) =
q∑
k=1
pk(1− pk)m−1 · Pχ/k(m− 1, q − 1).
On the other hand, the probability of event B, or that smearing is achieved within the first
m− 1 samples, is simply Pχ(m− 1, q), so
Pχ(m, q) = Pχ(m− 1, q) +
q∑
k=1
pk(1− pk)m−1 · Pχ/k(m− 1, q − 1).

In the case where χ is the uniform distribution on [q], this relation becomes greatly simplified:
Lemma 4.3. For the uniform distribution on [q],
P (m, q) = P (m− 1, q) + P (m− 1, q − 1) ·
(
q − 1
q
)m−1
.
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Proof. We use the result of Proposition 4.2. In the uniform distribution, pk =
1
q
for every k.
Furthermore, for every k, χ/k is the uniform distribution on [q− 1], so Pχ/k(m− 1, q− 1) =
P (m− 1, q − 1). Therefore, if χ is the uniform distribution, then
Pχ(m, q) = Pχ(m− 1, q) +
q∑
k=1
pk(1− pk)m−1 · Pχ/k(m− 1, q − 1)
= P (m− 1, q) +
q∑
k=1
1
q
(
q − 1
q
)m−1
· P (m− 1, q − 1)
= P (m− 1, q) + P (m− 1, q − 1) ·
(
q − 1
q
)m−1
.

Lemma 4.3, if implemented as a recursive formula, provides a very rapid method of computing
P (m, q). The base cases are rather straightforward. If m < q, then
P (m, q) = 0,
since it is impossible to pick q different elements with fewer than q samples. If m = q, then
P (m, q) =
q!
qq
.
To see why this is the case, notice that if the number of samples is equal to q, then every
single sample must be a “success,” i.e. pick an element of [q] that has not been picked before.
For the first sample, one can pick any of [q], so the probability of success is q/q. For the
second sample, there are q − 1 unpicked elements, so the probability of success is (q − 1)/q.
For the third sample, there are now q − 2 elements that are not selected, so the probability
of success is now (q − 2)/q. This continues until the qth sample, for which there is only one
option left, giving a success probability of 1/q. Multiplying these probabilities together gives
q!/qq Finally, if q = 1, and m > 0, then P (m, q) = 1, as the first sample is always a success,
and one success is sufficient in this case.
Computing P (m, q) using the recursive formula of Lemma 4.3 along with these base cases
results in the computation of P (i, j) for each of 1 ≤ j ≤ q and j ≤ i ≤ j + (m− q). Hence,
the complexity of the recursive computation is on the order of q(m − q). Notice, however,
that as a result, one computes not just P (m, q), but also P (i, q) for all i ∈ [0,m], which is
very useful information to have for choosing parameters for the smearing attack (which will
be discussed later).
Figure 3 shows P (m, q) values for a range of m and q, calculated using this method.
While Lemma 4.3 provides an effective method of calculating smearing probabilities for
uniform distributions, using Proposition 4.2 to calculate smearing probabilities for non-
uniform distributions is inefficient, since, to calculate Pχ(m, q), one must calculate smearing
probabilities on all subsets of [q], which makes the complexity on the order of 2q · (m − q).
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Figure 3. P (m, q), 1 ≤ m ≤ 400 and 1 ≤ q ≤ 53.
A more efficient method for non-uniform smearing can be achieved by recursion in q, rather
than recursion in m, as described in the next section.
4.3. A Recursive Formula in q.
Proposition 4.4. Let χ be a discrete probability distribution on [q], with pq being the proba-
bility of picking the qth element. Let χ/q denote the probability distribution on q−1 elements
after the qth element has been removed from χ, and the remaining probabilities have been nor-
malized. Then,
Pχ(m, q) =
m−q+1∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
pkq(1− pq)m−k · Pχ/q(m− k, q − 1).
Proof. Let K be a random variable denoting the number of times the qth element is picked.
For smearing to occur, K must be at least 1 (else the qth element will not be chosen), but
cannot be greater than m−q+1. This is because there are m samples in total, and one needs
at least q − 1 of them to cover the first q − 1 elements, leaving a maximum of m − (q − 1)
available for the qth element. Then, by the Law of Total Probability,
Pχ(m, q) =
m−q+1∑
k=1
Pr(K = k) · Pr(smearing|K = k).
Since the samples are drawn independently, notice that K ∼ Bin(m, pq). Therefore,
Pr(K = k) =
(
m
k
)
pkq(1− pq)m−k.
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On the other hand, the probability that smearing occurs given that the qth element is chosen
k times, where k ∈ [1,m − q + 1]), is the probability that m − k samples, taken from χ/q,
smear on [q − 1]. Hence,
Pr(smearing|K = k) = Pχ/q(m− k, q − 1).
Finally,
Pχ(m, q) =
m−q+1∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
pkq(1− pq)m−k · Pχ/q(m− k, q − 1).

Using Proposition 4.4 as a basis for a recursive method of calculating Pχ(m, q) is more
efficient than using Proposition 4.2. The base cases are very similar to those in Section 4.2.
If m < q, then Pχ(m, q) = 0, and if q = 1 and m > 0, then Pχ(m, q) = 1, for the same reasons
as in the uniform case. To find Pχ(q, q), notice that, as in the uniform case, each sample
must pick an element of [q] which has not been picked before. Hence, if q samples smear,
they must be a permutation of [q]. Each such permutation has a probability of
∏q
k=1 pk,
where pk is the probability of picking the kth element, and there are q! such permutations,
meaning the probability of smearing is
Pχ(q, q) = q! ·
q∏
k=1
pk.
As expected, when χ is uniform, pk = 1/q for every k, so the formula simplifies to the one
in Section 4.2.
Calculating Pχ(m, q) recursively using Proposition 4.4 along with these base cases results
in the computation of Pχ/[j+1,q](i, j) for each of 1 ≤ j ≤ q and j ≤ i ≤ j + (m − q). In
turn, the computation of each of these values requires a sum of on the order of m− q terms.
Hence, the complexity of this recursive method is on the order of q · (m− q)2. Notice that,
as in the recursion-in-m method, this recursion-in-q method results in the calculation of not
just P (m, q), but also Pχ(i, q) for all i ∈ [0,m]. Of course, an attacker on PLWE would not
have prior knowledge of the non-uniform distribution χ, but such information is nevertheless
useful in a retrospective analysis of the effectiveness of the smearing attack (discussed later).
5. The Smearing Attack
Here, we build on the previous sections to present a smearing-based attack on Polynomial
Learning With Errors, which we call the “smearing attack.”
5.1. The Uniform Distribution Smears the Best. A fundamental principle regarding
uniform and non-uniform smearing is as follows. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let χ be a distribution on [q], and let i 6= j, be two elements of [q]. Let pi and
pj be the probabilities of selecting i and j respectively. Construct χ
′ as follows: take χ, and
replace the probabilities of i and j with (pi + pj)/2. Then,
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Pχ(m, q) ≤ Pχ′(m, q),
with equality if and only if pi = pj.
Proof. Define K as the random variable representing the number of samples from the distri-
bution which fall into {i, j}. Notice that K ∼ Bin(m, pi + pj), for both χ and χ′. Let k be a
specific instance of K, k ≥ 2. Conditioned on K = k, smearing on {i, j} is independent from
smearing on [q]/{i, j}, and since the probabilities on [q]/{i, j} are unchanged between χ and
χ′, to compare Pχ(m, q) and Pχ′(m, q) it suffices to compare the probabilities of picking at
least one of each of i and j for both distributions, restricted to what is going on with these
k samples. For χ, this probability is
Pr(picking both i and j|K = k) = 1− Pr(not picking both i and j|K = k)
= 1− (Pr(picking only i|K = k) + Pr(picking only j|K = k))
= 1−
((
pi
pi + pj
)k
+
(
pj
pi + pj
)k)
= 1− p
k
i + p
k
j
(pi + pj)k
,
since the probability of picking i out of {i, j} is pi/(pi + pj) and similarly with j. For χ′, a
similar computation shows that
Pr(picking both i and j|K = k) = 1−
(pi+pj
2
)k
+
(pi+pj
2
)k((pi+pj
2
)
+
(pi+pj
2
))k
= 1−
(pi+pj
2
)k
+
(pi+pj
2
)k
(pi + pj)k
.
It remains, thus, to show that
pki + p
k
j ≥
(
pi + pj
2
)k
+
(
pi + pj
2
)k
,
with equality if and only if pi = pj. To show this, consider this as an optimization prob-
lem, where we try to minimize the quantity f(Pi, Pj) = P
k
i + P
k
j subject to the constraint
g(Pi, Pj) = pi + pj. By method of Lagrangian multipliers, setting ∇f = λ∇g gives
kP k−1i = kP
k−1
j = λ,
which implies that P ki + P
k
j is minimized at Pi = Pj = (pi + pj)/2. Hence,
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pki + p
k
j ≥
(
pi + pj
2
)k
+
(
pi + pj
2
)k
,
with equality if and only if pi = pj. This implies that
Pχ(m, q|K = k) ≤ Pχ′(m, q|K = k)
for k ≥ 2. Then, by the Law of Total Probability,
Pχ′(m, q)− Pχ(m, q) =
(
m−q+2∑
k=2
Pχ′(m, q|K = k) · Pr(K = k)
)
−
(
m−q+2∑
k=2
Pχ(m, q|K = k) · Pr(K = k)
)
=
m−q+2∑
k=2
(Pχ′(m, q|K = k)− Pχ(m, q|K = k)) · Pr(K = k)
≥
m−q+2∑
k=2
0 · Pr(K = k)
= 0.
Therefore,
Pχ(m, q) ≤ Pχ′(m, q),
with equality if and only if pi = pj, as seen from the optimization problem. 
Theorem 5.2. Let χ be a probability distribution over [q], and let U be the uniform distri-
bution over [q]. Then,
Pχ(m, q) ≤ PU(m, q),
with equality if and only if χ = U .
Proof. From χ = χ0, build a new distribution χN+1 by selecting two elements in [q] from the
previous distribution χN , and replacing their two probabilities pi and pj with (pi + pj)/2,
their average. By Lemma 5.1,
PχN+1(m, q) ≥ PχN (m, q)
We construct a sequence {χN} such that {PχN (m, q)}∞N=0 is a non-decreasing, infinite se-
quence with limit PU(m, q). This shows that Pχ(m, q) ≤ PU(m, q). Furthermore, if Pχ(m, q) =
PU(m, q), then the sequence is constant, meaning PχN (m, q) = PχN+1(m, q) for all N . By
Lemma 5.1, this is only possible if, for each step, pi = pj, meaning that χ0 = χ1 = ... =
χN = .... Then, {χN}∞N=0 is a constant sequence with limit U , hence χ = U . 
This principle is the driving force behind the attack on the Decision-PLWE problem, as
described in the following sections.
5.2. The Smearing Decision. The foundation of the smearing attack is in what we call
the “smearing decision”: given a large number of samples from some probability distribution
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Figure 4. Probability of smearing for a uniform distribution (green) and a
non-uniform distribution (blue), as a function of m (q = 53, n = 2, σ = 6,
γ = 2).
over Zq, decide, with some certainty, whether that distribution is the uniform distribution
U , or a certain non-uniform distribution χ. We do this in the following way.
(1) Choose the parameters N , indicating the number of trials to be done, and m, the
number of samples to be taken per trial. N must be odd, while m must be picked
such that PU(m, q) > 1/2 while Pχ(m, q) < 1/2. Since PU(m, q) > Pχ(m, q) for all
m ≥ q, and both PU(m, q) and Pχ(m, q), as functions of m, have range [0, 1), such
an m exists almost always.
(2) For each trial, take m samples, and check whether they smear on Zq. If smearing
happens for more than half of the N trials, conclude that the samples were taken
from the uniform distribution over Zq. If, on the other hand, the smearing happens
for less than half of the N trials, conclude that the samples were taken from χ.
To give an intuitive explanation of this decision process, consider the two graphs shown in
Figures 4 and Figure 5. Figure 4 shows the smearing probability for the uniform distribution
(in green), and a non-uniform distribution (in blue) as a function of m. The non-uniform
distribution is a mapped Gaussian distribution, with the parameters q = 53, n = 2, σ = 6
(the standard deviation of the initial Gaussian), and γ = 2. As expected, for both curves,
when the number of samples is small, the probability of smearing is 0 (or close to 0), while
when the number of samples if large, smearing occurs almost always. The uniform and
non-uniform curves can really be differentiated only for some intermediate range of m.
We describe here a simple example of the smearing decision and the smearing attack in
general. Suppose that U or χ have equal probability. Assume that if smearing happens, the
distribution is assumed to be uniform, and if smearing does not happen, the distribution is
assumed to be non-uniform. Then, the the probability that the decision is correct, is
Pr(decision is correct) = Pr(decision is correct|U) Pr(U) + Pr(decision is correct|χ) Pr(χ)
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Figure 5. The probability of deciding between them correctly by whether
smearing happens or not.
= Pr(smearing happens|U) · 1
2
+ Pr(smearing doesn’t happen|χ) · 1
2
=
1
2
(PU(m, q) + (1− Pχ(m, q)))
=
1
2
+
1
2
(PU(m, q)− Pχ(m, q)).
Notice that since PU(m, q) > Pχ(m, q), the probability is strictly greater than half, and
increases linearly with the difference in the smearing probabilities of the uniform and non-
uniform distributions. The graph of the probabilities for different values of m is shown in
Figure 5. As expected, the probability is highest the distance between the two smearing
probability curves is the greatest.
The following proposition formalizes the idea of the smearing decision.
Proposition 5.3. Let U be the uniform distribution over Zq, and χ be some non-uniform
distribution over Zq. Let m be an integer such that PU(m, q) > 1/2 and Pχ(m, q) < 1/2.
Then, given arbitrarily small α, β > 0, there exists an N such that the smearing decision
with N trials is correct, in the case where the true distribution is U , with probability 1− α,
and in the case where the true distribution is χ, with probability 1− β.
Proof. Consider the case in which the unknown distribution about which the decision is
being made is actually U . Define X to be a random variable denoting the number of trials
for which the samples smear. In this case, for each trial, smearing happens with probability
PU(m, q) (which we denote as simply PU for convenience), and the trials are independent
from one another. Hence, X ∼ Bin(N,PU), so E(X) = NPU and Var(X) = NPU(1 − PU).
In this case, the probability that the smearing decision is incorrect is the probability that
fewer than N/2 trials smear. Using Chebyshev’s Inequality, which states that for a random
variable X, and any c > 0,
Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ cσ) ≤ 1
c2
,
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we conclude that
Pr(decision is incorrect|U) = Pr
(
X <
N
2
)
= Pr
(
NPU −X > N
(
PU − 1
2
))
≤ Pr
(
|NPU −X| ≥ N
(
PU − 1
2
))
≤ PU(1− PU)
N
(
PU − 12
)2 .
Hence,
lim
N→∞
Pr(decision is incorrect|U) = 0,
so, in particular, we can choose N1 large enough such that this quantity is less than α. On
the other hand, in the case where the unknown distribution is χ, X ∼ Bin(N,Pχ) (where we
denote Pχ(m, q) by Pχ for convenience), the decision is incorrect whenever smearing happens
in more than N/2 trials. By a similar argument as above,
Pr(decision is incorrect|χ) = Pr
(
X >
N
2
)
= Pr
(
X −NPχ > N
(
1
2
− Pχ
))
≤ Pr
(
|X −NPχ| ≥ N
(
1
2
− Pχ
))
≤ Pχ(1− Pχ)
N
(
1
2
− Pχ
)2 .
Thus,
lim
N→∞
Pr(decision is incorrect|χ) = 0,
In particular, choose N2 large enough such that this quantity is less than β. Lastly, choose
N = max(N1, N2), which then satisfies both conditions of the proposition. 
5.3. The Smearing Attack. The proposed smearing attack on the Decision-PLWE prob-
lem proceeds as follows. Assume that we know Pq (and a root γ of the polynomial f(x)),
and have access to a large number of samples (ai, bi) ∈ Pq × Pq.
Algorithm. The algorithm for the smearing attack works as follows:
(1) Choose the parameters m and N to achieve the desired error probabilities α and β
and fix a guess g ∈ Zq for the true value of s(γ) (assuming that the (ai, bi) are drawn
from the PLWE distribution. , and denotes that guess g ∈ Zq.
(2) Make the following smearing decision: for each of N trials, take m samples (ai, bi),
compute the set {bi(γ)− ai(γ) · g}, and determine whether the set smears, i.e. covers
all of Zq.
(a) If smearing happens for more than half of the trials, conclude that the error
distribution resulting from the guess g is uniform.
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(b) If smearing happens for less than half of the trials, conclude that the error
distribution from the guess g is non-uniform.
(3) Repeat the steps above for each possible guess g ∈ Zq.
(a) If the error distribution is uniform for all values of g ∈ Zq, conclude that the
samples (ai, bi) originally came from a uniform distribution.
(b) If the error distribution is uniform for all but one value of g, conclude that the
samples (ai, bi) originally came from the PLWE distribution. In this case, the
value of g which gives a non-uniform error distribution is likely to be the true
value of the secret s evaluated at γ.
(c) If the error distribution is non-uniform for more than one value of g, choose
different parameters m and N and repeat the steps from the algorithm.
If (ai, bi) actually came from the uniform distribution over Pq × Pq, then, for any value of
g ∈ Zq, the values of bi(γ) − ai(γ) · g would also be uniformly distributed over Zq. If, on
the other hand, (ai, bi) came from the PLWE distribution, but g was the incorrect guess for
s(γ), then the bi(γ) − ai(γ) · g values would also be uniformly distributed over Zq. Finally,
if (ai, bi) came from the PLWE distribution, and g was the correct guess for s(γ), only in
this case would the bi(γ)− ai(γ) · g values follow the distribution of the PLWE error term e
when mapped only Zq by evaluating e at x = γ. Hence, while we referred to ththe calculated
values follow only the true error distribution over Zq in the last case.
For a well-chosen parameters m and N , the smearing attack described above correctly dis-
tinguishes between the PLWE and the uniform distributions over Pq × Pq almost always, as
formalized the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4. Let α and β be respectively the Type 1 and Type 2 errors of the smear-
ing decision over Zq. Then, if the true distribution of the samples (ai, bi) is the uniform
distribution over Pq × Pq, the smearing attack gives the correct decision with probabilit
1− α
1 + (q − 1)α.
If the true distribution of the samples (ai, bi) is the PLWE distribution over Pq × Pq, the
smearing attack gives the correct decision with probability
1− α− β + qαβ
1− α + (q − 1)αβ .
Proof. First, assume that the original distribution over Pq × Pq is uniform. Then, we are
concerned with only two outcomes: that all q decisions indicate uniform distribution, or that
one of the q decisions indicates non-uniform distribution, while the rest indicate uniform.
In this case, the probability that all q decisions indicate that the error distribution is uniform
is the probability that all the smearing decisions are correct, which is (1 − α)q. On the
other hand, the probability of one of the decisions indicating that the error distribution is
non-uniform, while the rest indicating uniform is the probability that one of the smearing
decisions is incorrect, while the rest are correct, which is qα(1−α)q−1. In the first outcome,
the attack would indicate that the distribution is uniform, while in the second outcome, the
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attack would indicate that the distribution is the PLWE distribution. Thus, the probability
that in this case the attack is successful is
(1− α)q
(1− α)q + qα(1− α)q−1 =
1− α
1 + (q − 1)α.
On the other hand, assume that the original distribution over Pq × Pq is the PLWE distri-
bution. In this case, for q − 1 of the guesses for g, the error distribution will be uniform,
while for the correct guess, the error distribution will be the mapped Gaussian distribution.
Correspondingly, there are three possible outcomes:
(1) All q of the smearing decisions could indicate that the error distribution over Zqis
uniform, which means that q−1 of the smearing decisions were correct with choosing
the uniform distribution, while the smearing decision corresponding to the correct
guess was incorrect in choosing the uniform distribution. The probability of this
outcome is (1− α)q−1β
(2) The q − 1 of the smearing decisions could indicate that the error distribution is
uniform, while the smearing decision corresponding to the correct guess could indicate
that the error distribution is non-uniform. This means all smearing decisions were
done correctly, the probability of which is (1− α)q−1(1− β).
(3) The q − 1 of the smearing decisions could indicate that the error distribution is
uniform, while one smearing decision could indicate that the error distribution is
non-uniform, but that smearing decision is the one which corresponds to a wrong
guess g. In this case, q − 2 of the smearing decisions need to identify a uniform
distribution correctly, the one corresponding to the right guess g needs to fail in
identifying a non-uniform distribution, and one smearing decision corresponding to a
wrong guess for g needs to fail in identifying a uniform distribution. The probability
of this happening is (q − 1)(1− α)q−2αβ.
The first outcome gives a incorrect smearing decision, while the second and third would give
the correct smearing decision. Therefore, the probability that the attack is successful if the
original distribution is the PLWE distribution is
(1− α)q−1(1− β) + (q − 1)(1− α)q−1αβ
(1− α)q−1β + (1− α)q−1(1− β) + (q − 1)(1− α)q−2αβ =
1− α− β + qαβ
1− α + (q − 1)αβ .

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